Expert Evidence in Medical Liability: Burden of Proof and the Role of the Expert

Overview

A medical liability (responsabilité médicale) claim is decided by a judge who, in almost every case, has no medical training. The plaintiff must prove that the physician departed from the standard of the reasonably prudent practitioner, and that departure can only be measured against the usages of the profession. evidence (preuve d') is therefore the channel through which the court learns what the (règles de l'art) required. This lesson, the fourth in the series on medical liability, sets out the and , explains why courts treat an expertise as a near necessity in professional liability, describes the mission the Code of Civil Procedure assigns to the expert, and analyzes the three qualities every expertise must display: it must be useful and relevant, competent, and objective and impartial. It closes with the criticism some judges have directed at experts who confuse their mission with advocacy. The fifth note in the series continues with the practical problems of the expert witness and the question of immunity.

Learning Objectives

State the burden and degree of proof under arts. 2803 and 2804 CCQ and apply them to a medical liability claim.
Explain why the judge remains the final arbiter even when experts testify, and locate that principle in Roberge c. Bolduc and art. 238 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Assess an expertise against the requirements of usefulness and relevance, competence, and objectivity and impartiality, using the case law that illustrates each failure.

Burden and Degree of Proof

The General Rules of the Civil Code

Medical liability follows the ordinary rules of civil evidence. Art. 2803 CCQ places the burden on the person who wishes to assert a right to prove the facts supporting the claim, and on the person who alleges that a right is null, modified, or extinguished to prove the facts on which that allegation rests. The patient therefore carries the burden of establishing fault (faute), injury (préjudice), and causation (lien de causalité). The physician who raises a defence, such as the patient's contributory conduct, bears the burden of proving the facts underlying it.

Art. 2804 CCQ sets the degree of proof: evidence that renders the existence of a fact more probable than its non-existence is sufficient, unless the law requires more convincing proof. This is the (prépondérance des probabilités). The patient need not eliminate every alternative explanation for a poor outcome, but must show that the explanation involving fault is more likely than those that do not.

The contested facts are often mundane rather than scientific. In Roy c. Mout, 2013 QCCS 161, the parties disagreed about who had discharged the patient from hospital and when, a point the expert reports left unresolved. Because the events dated back more than fourteen years, the Superior Court (Cour supérieure) allowed the plaintiffs to see period photographs of the three defendants to refresh their memory, subject to a non-publication order. The burden under art. 2803 CCQ attaches to every material fact, and proving who did what can be as difficult as proving what the rules of the art required.

The Threshold in Medical Cases

The general rules take on a particular colour because the physician's obligation is one of means (obligation de moyens). Proof that the treatment failed does not suffice; the patient must prove that the physician's conduct fell below the standard of the reasonably prudent physician in the same circumstances. In Kastner c. Royal Victoria Hospital, J.E. 2000-92 (C.S.), affirmed J.E. 2002-711 (C.A.), the Superior Court held that medical or hospital liability exists only where there is clear proof of a manifest error in a diagnosis leading to an error in treatment or to an absence of treatment (TR).

That formulation should be read with art. 2804 CCQ in mind. The plaintiff is still held to the balance of probabilities, not to a higher standard. What Kastner emphasizes is the content of what must be proven: an actual departure from accepted practice, demonstrated clearly enough that a court without medical training can identify it. The presumptions of fact under art. 2849 CCQ may assist, but they do not dispense the plaintiff from showing what a prudent physician would have done. That showing is almost always made through expert evidence.

The Role of Expertise and of Professional Usages

The Judge as Final Arbiter

A cynical definition from the American literature describes the expert as a person who was not present at the event but who, for the appropriate fee, will gladly imagine how and why it happened. It captures the tension the law must manage: the court needs the expert's knowledge, yet the expert is retained and paid by a party.

The Supreme Court of Canada addressed that tension in Roberge c. Bolduc, [1991] 1 R.C.S. 374. The judge remains the final arbiter and is not bound by the testimony of experts. This is particularly true in professional liability, where an expert's testimony does not bind the court on the precise legal question the judge must decide, because that question belongs to the judge. Two consequences follow. Whether a practice meets the legal standard of the reasonably prudent professional is a question of law, and the expert's account of what the profession usually does is only an input. And a widespread usage is not conclusive; the court may find that a common practice is nonetheless negligent.

The Code of Civil Procedure codifies this position. Art. 238 requires that the expert's report be brief but sufficiently detailed and reasoned so that the court is itself able to assess the facts set out and the reasoning that justifies the conclusions, and requires the report to mention the method of analysis used. The same article provides that the expert's conclusions bind neither the court nor the parties, unless the parties declare that they accept them. Art. 2845 CCQ completes the picture: the of testimony, including expert testimony, is left to the assessment of the court. A practical corollary follows: if the judge does not believe the plaintiff on the facts, the claim fails regardless of the quality of the expert report, because the opinion is only as good as its factual premises.

The course material illustrates the pressure experts face. A group of specialists wrote to a colleague who had testified for the plaintiff in a case that ended in the physician's condemnation, questioning the ethics of acting against someone the expert knows personally, or against a professor in the same university department, and suggesting that such mandates go to persons less involved. The letter shows why independent experts are hard to find in a small professional community, and why the law insists on the primacy of the expert's mission toward the court.

The Near Necessity of Expert Evidence

Baudouin's treatise observes that the usefulness of an expertise poses no particular difficulty in professional liability, since the judge is generally a layperson. Because the standard of care is defined by reference to the , the court cannot identify that standard without evidence from someone who knows those usages. In C.L. c. St-Arnaud, 2011 QCCS 2360, affirmed 2013 QCCA 981, the Superior Court stated the principle directly: the conduct of a professional is analyzed in light of the rules of the art that a prudent and diligent professional would have applied in the same circumstances, and it is the experts of the relevant field who enlighten the court on professional usages and customs.

The Quebec Court of Appeal (Cour d'appel) recognized the same dependence in the context of prescription. In Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse (Jalbert) c. Ville de Montréal, 2019 QCCA 1435, the Court recalled that prescription runs only from the victim's knowledge that a fault causing damage was committed, and that this knowledge is sometimes acquired later, when an external source confirms the victim's impression, notably where a particular expertise is required to determine whether a fault was committed, for example in medical matters. Comparative authority agrees: in Sutherland c. Alatishe, 2016 NBBR 105, affirmed 2017 CanLII 56743 (NB CA), the New Brunswick court held that a plaintiff suing a physician must produce expert testimony attesting to the breach of the standard of care, failing which the claim has no chance of success.

Proceeding Without an Expert

The practical rule is blunt: no expertise, no fault. In Sullivan c. Aubry, 2013 QCCS 4345, a patient reproached her physician for failing to diagnose her cancer in time. She was represented by counsel but had no expert report, and the court held that she could not prove fault without one. Under the ordinary rule the losing party pays costs, but the judge showed some sympathy and left the expert fees to be borne by each party.

Maintaining a claim after the expert evidence has collapsed is worse. In Guénard c. Houle, 2010 QCCS 2628, affirmed 2012 QCCA 249, the plaintiff's own expert, who first met the plaintiff more than four years after the action was instituted, attributed no fault to the surgeon, and the defence reports were to the same effect. At trial, the experts confirmed that the surgeon bore no responsibility for the choice or administration of the anaesthetic. The plaintiff nonetheless maintained the action, even after defence counsel asked whether it was being pursued. The court declared the claim against the surgeon abusive, found that the procedure had been used unreasonably, and, under the abuse-of-procedure provisions then in force, awarded the surgeon his proven travel disbursements plus $10,000 for eight lost days of fee-for-service income, a total of $12,736.88.

Under the current Code, art. 51 allows the court, on request or on its own initiative, to declare that a judicial demand or other procedural act is abusive. Abuse may result, regardless of intention, from a claim that is manifestly unfounded, frivolous, or dilatory, from vexatious or quarrelsome conduct, or from the excessive or unreasonable use of procedure. A claim that continues after every expert has cleared the defendant fits within that definition.

The Role of the Expert

The 2016 Code of Civil Procedure restated the role of the expert in terms that leave no room for advocacy. Art. 22 provides that the expert retained by one of the parties, common to the parties, or appointed by the court has the mission, in contentious and non-contentious matters alike, of enlightening the court in its decision-making. That mission takes precedence over the interests of the parties, and the expert must fulfil it with objectivity, impartiality, and rigour.

Art. 231 defines the purpose of the expertise: to enlighten the court and assist it in assessing evidence by calling on a person competent in the discipline or matter concerned. The expertise consists, taking into account the facts of the dispute, in giving an opinion on matters related to the integrity, condition, capacity, or adaptation of a person to certain factual situations, or on factual or material elements related to the evidence.

Three features matter in the medical context. The expert's duty is owed to the court, not to the retaining party. The opinion must be grounded in the facts of the dispute, which means the expert must actually inform themselves of those facts. And competence in the discipline concerned is a condition of the mission itself rather than a mere factor going to weight. Art. 237 gives these requirements teeth: an expert who lacks the required competence or who seriously fails in the duties of the mission may be , in particular at a case management conference, on the court's initiative or on the request of either party.

Characteristics of a Valid Expertise

Useful and Relevant

An expertise is useful only where the court needs assistance on a matter outside its own knowledge. The clearest boundary is the law itself. In Bailey v. Fasken Martineau Dumoulin, SRL, 2005 CanLII 13745 (QC CS), a negligence claim against a lawyer, the court held that it did not require legal experts on questions of Quebec law or contractual interpretation, because under art. 2807 CCQ the courts take of the law in force in Quebec. The court added, however, that where a client alleges a departure from usual practice, the opinion of an experienced member of the Bar in the same specialized field is an important element of proof, because it helps identify the standard of the reasonably competent lawyer in that area. The same distinction applies to medicine: the expert speaks to the usages of the profession, not to the legal standard the court derives from them.

Relevance also excludes evidence that purports to do the court's own work. In Cardinal c. Bonnaud, 2018 QCCA 1357, the plaintiffs, alleging a breach of the duty to inform about a contraceptive, filed the report of a polygraph interview to show that the patient had not lied. The trial judge rejected it and the Court of Appeal affirmed: the report contained no scientific or technical information and no analysis of the physiological data observed, so it was not sufficiently detailed or reasoned and did not state its method, contrary to art. 238 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The deeper objection is that credibility is a question for the judge alone.

Competent

Art. 231 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires a person competent in the discipline or matter concerned. Professor Catherine Piché explains in La preuve civile that the party producing an expert must first establish that competence, which is acquired by study or experience. Scientists, academics, and professionals are the usual expert witnesses, but the title may also be given to persons with particular experiential knowledge on a technical question.

Competence is assessed in relation to the precise question at issue, and the case law offers cautionary examples.

Inexperience. In Gold c. Gold, [1963] C.S. 45, the plaintiff called a recently admitted intern who alternated between the roles of intern and relieving nurse. The court was not impressed: the testimony consisted mostly of reading and interpreting the hospital record, and the witness did not claim expertise on the effects of drugs on brain function.
Ignorance of the local organization of care. In J.G. c. Nadeau, 2013 QCCS 410, affirmed 2016 QCCA 167, leave to appeal refused 2017 CanLII 10071 (CSC), the court rejected a plaintiff's expert who asserted that a premature infant should have been transferred immediately to a tertiary centre. The opinion contradicted the three other experts and rested on the mistaken assumption that the hospital lacked qualified staff and equipment. The same expert, with no knowledge of how care is organized in Quebec, opined that an anaesthetist should have been present around the clock, whereas that organization of care was not, and still is not, the one that prevails in Quebec hospitals, including tertiary centres.
Mismatched specialty. In Rondeau c. Lemay, 2014 QCCS 4154, the court held that the opinion of a thrombophlebitis specialist who did not practise emergency medicine should not found a rule of the art for physicians without his degree of specialization; S.T. c. Dubois, 2008 QCCS 1431, is to the same effect. In Levine c. Mohr, 2018 QCCS 1260, three neurosurgeons disagreed about when a "central fever" can arise. The court gave their opinions only relative value, noting that one had cited no scientific literature and that the question belonged to neurology, internal medicine, or infectious diseases rather than neurosurgery.
Wrong profession. In C.L. c. St-Arnaud, the parties called physicians to assess the acts of nurses. The court asked why: nursing is a profession recognized by the Professional Code, taught in colleges and universities, with its own scientific corpus. Since the experts of the field enlighten the court on professional usages, the appropriate expert on a nursing act is a nurse. The court added that the practice of calling physicians for that purpose has a significant impact on costs.

The retaining party must match the expert to the question. A distinguished specialist is not competent to define the standard of a general practitioner in an emergency department, and a physician is not the right witness on the rules of the art of nursing.

Objective and Impartial

The third requirement generates the most litigation. In Fortier c. Lavoie, 2012 QCCA 754, the Court of Appeal endorsed the premise that an expert report must be objective and rigorous and contain detailed, precise, and relevant data, adding that drafting a report with objectivity and rigour is not part of the practice of medicine; the requirement is the same for every discipline.

Several normative sources converge.

Art. 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires objectivity, impartiality, and rigour and subordinates the interests of the parties to the mission of enlightening the court.
Art. 67 of the Code de déontologie des médecins requires a physician acting as expert or assessor to explain with objectivity and impartiality to the person examined the purpose, objects, and means of the assessment, and to communicate the report with objectivity, impartiality, and diligence.
The Collège des médecins du Québec's guide La médecine d'expertise: guide d'exercice (2021) states that the expert's role differs from the clinician's, and instructs the expert to avoid complaisance toward whichever party retains them, to base the opinion on the practice of medicine, to show openness by acting for different parties, and to reason without regard to the desire for a future mandate. This is soft law, but it shapes the expectations against which an expert's conduct is judged.

In E.S. c. Ferenczy, 2012 QCCS 1988, the court adopted the factors identified by Justice Rochon of the Court of Appeal in 2842-1733 Québec inc. c. Allstate du Canada: the court observes the expert's attitude, whether the expert shows subjectivity or objectivity, whether the expert has an interest in the matter, and how the expert approaches and engages with the theories of the other experts; secondarily, it examines the expert's reputation among peers.

The case law identifies recurring risks.

Structural dependence on one client. In Andrusiak c. Montréal (Ville de), 2014 QCCS 2949, the court rejected a defence expert who had trivialized the events, noting that the City apparently used him roughly once every two weeks and, without questioning his honesty, that such a relationship may create unconscious dangers of partiality.
Reports drafted at the client's dictation. In Côté, 2006 QCCS 5748, several versions of a report had circulated. The court expressed surprise that a professional, a sub-specialist no less, would modify his report at the simple dictation of his client, and noted that, questioned about it, he did not really answer. An expert is not a puppet.
Refusal to consider the other side's account. In Dufour c. Tanios Hanna, 2018 QCCS 4434, the plaintiff's expert wrote his reports without reading the defendant physician's examination on discovery, relying on the plaintiff's version alone, and did not change his approach at trial even after conceding that the transcript would have been important. The court found this surprising, to say the least, from an expert whose mission is to enlighten the judge with objectivity, impartiality, and rigour, especially when judging another physician's conduct in the same circumstances at the time of the events.

Where the failure is serious, art. 237 permits the expert to be replaced or disavowed. The Supreme Court of Canada, in White Burgess Langille Inman c. Abbott and Haliburton Co., 2015 CSC 23, confirmed that an expert's lack of independence and impartiality bears both on admissibility and on weight, consistent with the gatekeeping role of trial judges, and recalled Justice Binnie's warning in J.-L.J. that expert evidence should not be admitted too readily on the ground that its weaknesses go only to weight. Although White Burgess arose outside Quebec, the principle aligns with arts. 22 and 237 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Worked example: the mismatched expert

Marie consults a family physician in Trois-Rivières about persistent abdominal pain. The physician orders blood tests, finds nothing alarming, and advises her to return if the pain continues. Eleven months later, another physician diagnoses an advanced ovarian cancer. Marie sues the first physician for a delayed diagnosis.

Under arts. 2803 and 2804 CCQ, Marie must prove on a balance of probabilities that a reasonably prudent family physician, faced with her symptoms and results at the time, would have ordered imaging or referred her to a specialist. She cannot establish that standard from her own testimony or the medical file. Her lawyer retains a gynaecologic oncologist from a university hospital, who writes that any competent physician would have ordered an ultrasound at the first visit.

Three problems appear. The expert is a sub-specialist opining on the standard of a community family physician; under Rondeau c. Lemay, that opinion may not found a rule of the art for physicians without his degree of specialization. The report relies entirely on Marie's account and ignores the physician's clinical notes and discovery transcript, the flaw identified in Dufour c. Tanios Hanna. And it states no method of analysis, contrary to art. 238 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Defence counsel moves to have the expert disavowed under art. 237 or argues that the report deserves little weight, and the judge, as final arbiter under Roberge c. Bolduc, remains free to prefer a defence expert who practises family medicine. Marie's counsel would have been better served by a family physician expert, briefed with the complete file, who compares the defendant's conduct against the reasonably prudent practitioner rather than an ideal.

The Exasperation of Certain Judges

In Gburek c. Cohen, [1988] R.J.Q. 2424 (C.A.), Justice Beauregard observed that medical liability cases require the judge to have at least enough scientific knowledge to weigh contradictory expert testimony, and suggested that a judge undertaking such a case would do well, for everyone's sake, to appoint an . He attributed the length of his own deliberation to the difficulty of evaluating the experts without such help, and deplored that some experts, though it is only human, misunderstand their role and believe themselves obliged to espouse their client's cause rather than express an objective opinion.

The same frustration appears at first instance. In E.S. c. Ferenczy, the court declined to accept the testimony of an experienced thoracic surgeon called by the defence, finding it partial and biased in tone, approach, and presentation, and reiterated that objectivity without partiality is a condition of credibility. In J.G. c. Nadeau, the court noted that the plaintiff's expert had repeatedly raised his voice and lost his temper, conduct that was not the neutrality and restraint a court is entitled to expect. Duguay c. Desjardins, 2005 CanLII 21049 (QC CS), is cited to similar effect, and in C.L. c. St-Arnaud the judge was unhappy with both experts.

Rainville c. Déry, 2020 QCCS 978, illustrates a subtler conflict. The defence expert, retained through the professional liability fund of the Ordre des dentistes du Québec, was the assistant of that same Order, whose mission is the protection of the public. During the trial he put on what the court called his syndic's hat and suggested that the opposing expert's conclusion, from a man the judgment describes as his mentor, colleague, and friend, approached disloyal conduct toward the defendant dentist, a fellow member of the profession. The court rejected the argument that his position added to his credibility and described the ethical attack, made in the other expert's absence, as out of place and of a nature to confirm the reluctance of some professionals to accept mandates against the Order and its fund.

Partisanship is not confined to one side. Professor Pierre Deschamps, in a 1991 article on the , reproduced the concern of the chief counsel of the Canadian Medical Protective Association about a "code of perfection" among plaintiffs' experts: standards applied to a colleague's work with which those experts themselves could not always comply, so that what was once an error of judgment was being treated as negligence. The passage is an insurer's perspective, but it identifies a real error: the expert who measures a colleague against ideal practice rather than the reasonably prudent practitioner has misapplied the legal standard.

Courts also recognize the expert who gets it right. In Ratelle c. Hôpital Cité de la santé de Laval, 2000 RRA 697 (C.S.), the court was impressed by an obstetrician-gynaecologist who, contrary to the tendency of experts to espouse the cause of the party who retained him, had tried as best he could to inform the court, which the court described as the very purpose of an expertise. Forest c. Podtetenev, 2016 QCCS 2679, is cited in the same vein.

Practice Checklist

Burden and degree of proof

Identify each fact the plaintiff must prove under art. 2803 CCQ: fault, injury, causation, and the chronology of care.
Confirm that the evidence on each fact reaches the balance of probabilities under art. 2804 CCQ.

Necessity of expert evidence

Retain an expert before instituting the action, or at the latest early in the proceeding.
Re-evaluate the claim immediately if the expert evidence does not support fault, to avoid a under art. 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Usefulness and relevance

Ensure the expert addresses the usages of the profession and the facts, not questions of Quebec law known by judicial notice under art. 2807 CCQ or matters of credibility reserved to the judge.

Competence

Match the expert's profession, specialization, and practice setting to the defendant's, including familiarity with the organization of care in Quebec.

Objectivity and impartiality

Provide the expert with the complete record, including the opposing party's discovery transcript and clinical notes.
Ensure the report is drafted by the expert, states its method, and is sufficiently reasoned under art. 238 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Screen for structural conflicts: personal relationships, disciplinary roles, or dependence on a single client.
Prepare the expert to testify with neutrality and restraint and to engage with the opposing experts' theories.

Glossary

Balance of probabilitiesprépondérance des probabilités: The civil degree of proof: evidence that renders the existence of a fact more probable than its non-existence (art. 2804 CCQ).
Burdenfardeau de preuve: The obligation of the party asserting a right to prove the facts on which the claim rests; in a medical liability claim, the patient carries the burden of proving fault, injury, and causation (art. 2803 CCQ).
Declaration of abuseabus de procédure: A court finding, under art. 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that a claim or procedural act is manifestly unfounded, frivolous, or dilatory, or an excessive or unreasonable use of procedure.
Degree of proofdegré de preuve: The standard of persuasion required; in civil matters, proof that makes a fact more probable than its non-existence suffices unless the law requires more (art. 2804 CCQ).
Expertexpert: The person retained by a party, common to the parties, or appointed by the court, whose mission is to enlighten the court and takes precedence over the interests of the parties (art. 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
Expertiseexpertise: The opinion of a person competent in a discipline, given to enlighten the court and assist it in assessing evidence (art. 231 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
Independent expertexpert indépendant: An expert appointed by the court rather than retained by a party, as recommended in Gburek c. Cohen.
Judicial noticeconnaissance d'office: The court's ability to take account of the law in force in Quebec without proof (art. 2807 CCQ).
Obligation of meansobligation de moyens: An undertaking to use reasonable care and diligence without guaranteeing a result; the physician's ordinary obligation.
Probative forceforce probante: The weight the court attaches to evidence, which for testimony is left to the court's assessment (art. 2845 CCQ).
Replaced or disavoweddésaveu de l'expert: The sanction under art. 237 of the Code of Civil Procedure for an expert who lacks the required competence or who seriously fails in the duties of the mission.
Rules of the artrègles de l'art: The recognized professional standards against which a practitioner's acts are measured.
Syndicsyndic: The officer of a professional order responsible for disciplinary investigation, whose mission is the protection of the public.
Usages and customs of the professionusages et coutumes de la profession: The recognized practices of a profession that inform the rules of the art and thus the standard of care.

References and Further Reading

Civil Code of Quebec: arts. 2803, 2804, 2807, 2845, 2849.
Code of Civil Procedure: arts. 22, 51, 231, 237, 238.
Code de déontologie des médecins, RLRQ c. M-9, r. 17: art. 67.
Collège des médecins du Québec, La médecine d'expertise: guide d'exercice, 2021.
Selected case law: Roberge c. Bolduc, [1991] 1 R.C.S. 374; Roy c. Mout, 2013 QCCS 161; Kastner c. Royal Victoria Hospital, J.E. 2000-92 (C.S.), aff'd J.E. 2002-711 (C.A.); Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse (Jalbert) c. Ville de Montréal, 2019 QCCA 1435; Sullivan c. Aubry, 2013 QCCS 4345; Sutherland c. Alatishe, 2016 NBBR 105, aff'd 2017 CanLII 56743 (NB CA); Guénard c. Houle, 2010 QCCS 2628, aff'd 2012 QCCA 249; Bailey v. Fasken Martineau Dumoulin, SRL, 2005 CanLII 13745 (QC CS); Cardinal c. Bonnaud, 2018 QCCA 1357; Gold c. Gold, [1963] C.S. 45; J.G. c. Nadeau, 2013 QCCS 410, aff'd 2016 QCCA 167; Rondeau c. Lemay, 2014 QCCS 4154; S.T. c. Dubois, 2008 QCCS 1431; Levine c. Mohr, 2018 QCCS 1260; C.L. c. St-Arnaud, 2011 QCCS 2360, aff'd 2013 QCCA 981; Fortier c. Lavoie, 2012 QCCA 754; E.S. c. Ferenczy, 2012 QCCS 1988; 2842-1733 Québec inc. c. Allstate du Canada; Andrusiak c. Montréal (Ville de), 2014 QCCS 2949; Côté, 2006 QCCS 5748; Dufour c. Tanios Hanna, 2018 QCCS 4434; White Burgess Langille Inman c. Abbott and Haliburton Co., 2015 CSC 23; Gburek c. Cohen, [1988] R.J.Q. 2424 (C.A.); Rainville c. Déry, 2020 QCCS 978; Duguay c. Desjardins, 2005 CanLII 21049 (QC CS); Ratelle c. Hôpital Cité de la santé de Laval, 2000 RRA 697 (C.S.); Forest c. Podtetenev, 2016 QCCS 2679.
Doctrine: Baudouin, La responsabilité civile, vol. 2; Catherine Piché, La preuve civile, 6th ed., Montréal, Éditions Yvon Blais, 2020; Pierre Deschamps, "L'obligation de moyens en matière de responsabilité médicale", (1991) 4 Assurances 575; Justin Murphy, "Expert Witnesses at Trial: Where are the Ethics?", (2000) 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 217.

Disclaimer

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Quebec civil law may evolve through legislation and judicial interpretation. For advice on a specific situation, consult a qualified Quebec lawyer or notary.